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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical au-
tonomous decision-making framework to address a task allo-
cation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider
cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed
decentralized algorithm guarantees convergence of agents with
social inhibition to a Nash stable partition (i.e., social agreement)
within polynomial time. The algorithm is simple and executable
based on local interactions with neighbor agents under a strongly-
connected communication network and even in asynchronous
environments. We analytically present a mathematical formu-
lation for computing the lower bound of suboptimality of the
solution, and additionally show that 50% of suboptimality can be
at least guaranteed if social utilities are non-decreasing functions
with respect to the number of co-working agents. The results
of numerical experiments confirm that the proposed framework
is scalable, fast adaptable against dynamical environments, and
robust even in a realistic situation.
Index Terms—Distributed robot systems, Networked robots,
Task allocation, Game theory, Self-organising systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation of a large number of possibly small-sized
robots, called robotic swarm, will play a significant role in
complex missions that existing operational concepts using
a few large robots could not deal with [1]. Even if every
single robot (or called agent) in a swarm is incapable of
accomplishing a task alone, their cooperation will lead to
successful outcomes [2]–[5]. The possible applications include
environmental monitoring [6], ad-hoc network relay [7], dis-
aster management [8], cooperative radar jamming [9], to name
a few.
Due to the large cardinality of a swarm robot system,
however, it is infeasible for human operators to supervise each
agent directly, but needed to entrust the swarm with certain
levels of decision-makings (e.g., task allocation, path planning,
and individual control). Thereby, what only remains is to
provide a high-level mission description, which is manageable
for a few or even a single human operator. Nevertheless,
there still exist various challenges in the autonomous decision-
making of robotic swarms. Among them, this paper addresses
a task allocation problem where the number of agents is
higher than that of tasks: how to partition a set of agents
into subgroups and assign the subgroups to each task. In the
problem, it is assumed that each agent can be assigned to at
most one task, whereas each task may require multiple agents:
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this case falls into ST-MR (single-task robot and multi-robot
task) category [10], [11].
According to [4], [5], [12]–[14], decision-making frame-
works for a robotic swarm should be decentralized (i.e., the
desired collective behavior can be achieved by individual
agents relying on local information), scalable, predictable
(e.g., regarding convergence performance and outcome qual-
ity), and adaptable to dynamic environments (e.g., unexpected
elimination or addition of agents or tasks). Moreover, the
frameworks are also desirable to be robust against asyn-
chronous environments because, due to the large cardinality
of the system and its decentralization, it is very challenging
for every agent to behave synchronously. For synchronization
in practice, “artificial delays and extra communication must be
built into the framework” [14], which may cause considerable
inefficiency on the system. In addition, it is also preferred to be
capable of accommodating different interests of agents (e.g.,
different swarms operated by different organizations [15]).
In this paper, we propose a novel decision-making frame-
work based on hedonic games [16]–[18]. The task allocation
problem considered is modeled as a coalition-formation game
where self-interest agents are willing to form coalitions to
improve their own interests. The objective of this game is
to find a Nash stable partition, which is a social agreement
where all the agents agree with the current task assignment.
Despite any possible conflicts between the agents, this paper
shows that if they have social inhibition, then a Nash stable
partition can always be determined within polynomial times in
the proposed framework and all the desirable characteristics
mentioned above can be achieved. Furthermore, we analyze
the lower bound of the outcome’s suboptimality and show
that 50% is at least guaranteed for a particular case. Various
settings of numerical experiments validate that the proposed
framework is scalable, adaptable, and robust even in asyn-
chronous environments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews exist-
ing literature on decentralized task allocation approaches and
introduces a recent finding in hedonic games that inspires this
study. Section III proposes our decision-making framework,
named GRAPE, and analytically proves the existence of and
the polynomial-time convergence to a Nash stable partition.
Section IV discusses the framework’s algorithmic complexity,
suboptimality, adaptability, and robustness. Section V shows
that the framework can also address a task allocation problem
in which each task may need a certain number of agents for
completion. Numerical simulations in Section VI confirm that
the proposed framework holds all the desirable characteristics.
Finally, concluding remarks are followed in Section VII.
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2II. RELATED WORK
A. Decentralized Coordination of Robotic Swarms
Existing approaches for task allocation problems can be
categorized into two branches, depending on how agents even-
tually reach a converged outcome: orchestrated and (fully) self-
organized approaches [19]. In the former, additional mech-
anism such as negotiation and voting model is imposed so
that some agents can be worse off if a specific condition
is met (e.g., the global utility is better off). Alternatively,
in self-organized approaches, each agent simply makes a
decision without negotiating with the other agents. The latter
generally induce less resource consumption in communication
and computation [20], and hence they are preferable in terms
of scalability. On the other hand, the former usually provide
a better quality of solutions with respect to the global utility,
and a certain level of suboptimality could be guaranteed [21]–
[23]. A comparison result between them [20] presents that
as the available information to agents becomes local, the
latter becomes to outperform the former. In the following,
we particularly review existing literature on self-organized
approaches because, for large-scale multiple agent systems,
scalability is at least essential and it is realistic to regard that
the agents only know their local information but instead the
global information.
Self-organized approaches can be categorized into top-down
approaches and bottom-up approaches according to which
level (i.e., between an ensemble and individuals) is mainly
focused on. Top-down approaches emphasize developing a
macroscopic model for the whole system. For instance, popu-
lation fractions associated with given tasks are represented as
states, and the dynamics of the population fractions is modeled
by Markov chains [12], [24]–[26] or differential equations
[27]–[31]. Given a desired fraction distribution over the tasks,
agents can converge to the desired status by following local
decision policies (e.g., the associated rows or columns of the
current Markov matrix). One advantage of using top-down
approaches is predictability of average emergent behavior
with regard to convergence speed and the quality of a stable
outcome (i.e., how well the agents converge to the desired
fraction distribution). However, such prediction, to the best of
our knowledge, can be made mainly numerically. Besides, as
top-down generated control policies regulate agents, it may be
difficult to accommodate each agent’s individual preference.
Also, each agent may have to physically move around ac-
cording to its local policy during the entire decision-making
process, which may cause waste of time and energy costs in
the transitioning.
Bottom-up approaches focus on designing each agent’s
individual rules (i.e., microscopic models) that eventually lead
to a desired emergent behavior. Possible actions of a single
agent can be modeled by a finite state machine [32], and a
change of behavior occurs according to a probabilistic thresh-
old model [33]. A threshold value in the model determines
the decision boundary between two motions. This value is
adjustable based on an agent’s past experiences such as the
time spent for working a task [19], [34], the success/failure
rates [32], [35], and direct communication from a central
unit [33]. This feature can improve system adaptability, and
may have a potential to incorporate each agent’s individual
interest if required. However, it was shown in [35]–[41] that,
to predict or evaluate an emergent performance of a swarm
utilizing bottom-up approaches, a macroscopic model for the
swarm is eventually required to be developed by abstracting
the microscopic models.
B. Hedonic Games
Hedonic games [16]–[18] model a conflict situation where
self-interest agents are willing to form coalitions to improve
their own interests. Nash stability [18] plays a key role since
it yields a social agreement among the agents even without
having any negotiation. Many researchers have investigated
conditions under which a Nash stable partition is guaranteed
to exist and to be determined [18], [42]–[44]. Among them, the
works in [43], [44] mainly addressed an anonymous hedonic
game, in which each agent considers the size of a coalition
to which it belongs instead of the identities of the members.
Recently, Darmann [44] showed that selfish agents who have
social inhibition (i.e., preference toward a coalition with a
fewer number of members) could converge to a Nash stable
partition in an anonymous hedonic game. The author also
proposed a centralized recursive algorithm that can find a Nash
stable partition within O(n2a ·nt) of iterations. Here, na is the
number of agents and nt is that of tasks.
C. Main Contributions
Inspired by the recent breakthrough of [44], we propose a
novel decentralized framework that models the task allocation
problem considered as an anonymous hedonic game. The
proposed framework is a self-organized approach in which
agents make decisions according to its local policies (i.e., indi-
vidual preferences). Unlike top-down or bottom-up approaches
reviewed in the previous section, which primarily concentrate
on designing agents’ decision-making policies either macro-
scopically or microscopically, our work instead focuses on in-
vestigating and exploiting advantages from socially-inhibitive
agents, while simply letting them greedily behave according to
their individual preferences. Explicitly, the main contributions
of this paper are as follows:
1) This paper shows that selfish agents with social inhibi-
tion, which we refer to as SPAO preference (Definition
4), can reach a Nash stable partition within less algorith-
mic complexity compared with [44]: O(n2a) of iterations
are required1.
2) We provide a decentralized algorithm, which is exe-
cutable under a strongly-connected communication net-
work of agents and even in asynchronous environments.
Depending on the network assumed, the algorithmic
complexity may be additionally increased by O(dG),
where dG < na is the graph diameter of the network.
3) This paper analyzes the suboptimality of a Nash stable
partition in term of the global utility. We firstly present a
1Note that the definition of iteration is described in Definition 5. This
comparison assumes the fully-connected communication network because the
algorithm in [44] is centralized.
3mathematical formulation to compute the suboptimality
lower bound by using the information of a Nash stable
partition and agents’ individual utilities. Furthermore,
we additionally show that 50% of suboptimality can be
at least guaranteed if the social utility for each coalition
is defined as a non-decreasing function with respect to
the number of members in the coalition.
4) Our framework can accommodate different agents with
different interests as long as their individual preferences
hold SPAO.
5) Through various numerical experiments, it is confirmed
that the proposed framework is scalable, fast adaptable
to environmental changes, and robust even in a realistic
situation where some agents are temporarily unable to
proceed a decision-making procedure and communicate
with the other agents during a mission.
TABLE I
NOMENCLATURE
Symbol Description
A a set of na agents
ai the i-th agent
T ∗ a set of nt tasks
tj the j-th task
tφ the void task (i.e., not to work any task)
T a set of tasks, T = T ∗ ∪ {tφ}
(tj , p) a task-coalition pair (i.e. to do task tj with p participants)
X the set of task-coalition pairs, X = X ∗ ∪ {tφ},
where X ∗ = T ∗ × {1, 2, ..., na}
Pi agent ai’s preference relation over X
i the strong preference of agent ai
∼i the indifferent preference of agent ai
i the weak preference of agent ai
Π a partition: a disjoint set that partitions the agent set A,
Π = {S1, S2, ..., Snt , Sφ}
Sj the (task-specific) coalition for tj
Π(i) the index of the task to which agent ai is assigned given Π
dG the graph diameter of the agent communication network
Ni The neighbor agent set of agent ai given a network
III. GROUP AGENT PARTITIONING AND PLACING EVENT
A. Problem Formulation
Let us first introduce the multi-robot task allocation problem
considered in this paper and underlying assumptions.
Problem 1. Suppose that there exist a set of na agents
A = {a1, a2, ..., ana} and a set of tasks T = T ∗ ∪ {tφ},
where T ∗ = {t1, t2, ..., tnt} is a set of nt tasks and tφ is the
void task (i.e., not to perform any task). Each agent ai has
the individual utility ui : T × |A| → R, which is a function
of the task to which the agent is assigned and the number
of its co-working agents (including itself) p ∈ {1, 2, ..., na}
(called participants). The individual utility for tφ is zero
regardless of the participants. Since every agent is considered
to have limited capabilities to finish a task alone, the agent
can be assigned to at most one task. The objective of this task
allocation problem is to find an assignment that maximizes
the global utility, which is the sum of individual utilities of
the entire agents. The problem described above is defined as
follows:
max
{xij}
∑
∀ai∈A
∑
∀tj∈T
ui(tj , p)xij , (1)
subject to ∑
∀tj∈T
xij ≤ 1, ∀ai ∈ A, (2)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ai ∈ A,∀tj ∈ T , (3)
where xij is a binary decision variable that indicates whether
or not task tj is assigned to agent ai.
The term social utility is defined as the sum of individual
utilities within any agent group.
Assumption 1 (Homogeneous agents with limited capabili-
ties). This paper considers a large-scale multi-robot system of
homogeneous agents since the realisation of a swarm can be
in general achieved through mass production [4]. Therefore,
each individual utility ui is concerned with the cardinality of
the agents working for the task. Note that agents in this paper
may have different preferences with respect to the given tasks,
e.g., for an agent, a spatially closer task is more preferred,
whereas this may not be the case for another agent. Besides,
noting that “mass production favors robots with fewer and
cheaper components, resulting in lower cost but also reduced
capabilities [45]”, it is also assumed that each agent can be
only assigned to perform at most a single task. According to
[10], such a robot is called a single-task (ST) robot.
Assumption 2 (Agents’ communication). The communication
network of the entire agents is at least strongly-connected, i.e.,
there exists a directed communication path between any two
arbitrary agents. Given a network,Ni denotes a set of neighbor
agents for agent ai.
Assumption 3 (Multi-robot-required tasks). Every task is a
multi-robot (MR) task, meaning that the task may require
multiple robots [10]. For now, we assume that each task can be
performed even by a single agent although it may take a long
time. However, in Section V, we will also address a particular
case in which some tasks need at least a certain number of
agents for completion.
Assumption 4 (Agents’ pre-known information). Every agent
ai only knows its own individual utility ui(tj , p) with regard
to every task tj , while not being aware of those of the
other agents. Through communication, however, they can
notice which agent currently choses which task, i.e., partition
(Definition 2). Note that the agents do not necessarily have to
know the true partition information at all the time. Each agent
owns its locally-known partition information.
B. Proposed Game-theoretical Approach: GRAPE
Let us transform Problem 1 into an anonymous hedonic
game event where every agent selfishly tends to join a coalition
according to its preference.
4Definition 1 (GRAPE). An instance of GRoup Agent Par-
titioning and placing Event (GRAPE) is a tuple (A, T ,P)
that consists of (1) A = {a1, a2, ..., ana}, a set of na
agents; (2) T = T ∗ ∪ {tφ}, a set of tasks; and (3)
P = (P1,P2, ...,Pna), an na-tuple of preference relations of
the agents. For agent ai, Pi describes its preference relation
over the set of task-coalition pairs X = X ∗ ∪ {tφ}, where
X ∗ = T ∗ × {1, 2, ..., na}; a task-coalition pair (tj , p) is in-
terpreted as “to do task tj with p participants”. For any
task-coalition pairs x1, x2 ∈ X , x1 i x2 implies that agent
ai strongly prefers x1 to x2, and x1 ∼i x2 means that the
preference regarding x1 and x2 is indifferent. Likewise, i
indicates the weak preference of agent ai.
Note that agent ai’s preference relation can be derived from
its individual utility ui(tj , p) in Problem 1. For instance, given
that ui(t1, p1) > ui(t2, p2), it can be said that (t1, p1) i
(t2, p2).
Definition 2 (Partition). Given an instance (A, T ,P)
of GRAPE, a partition is defined as a set Π =
{S1, S2, ..., Snt , Sφ} that disjointly partitions the agent set A.
Here, Sj ⊆ A is the (task-specific) coalition for executing
task tj such that ∪ntj=0Sj = A and Sj ∩ Sk = ∅ for j 6= k.
Sφ is the set of agents who choose the void task tφ. Note
that this paper interchangeably uses S0 to indicate Sφ. Given
a partition Π, Π(i) indicates the index of the task to which
agent ai is assigned. For example, SΠ(i) is the coalition that
the agent belongs to, i.e., SΠ(i) = {Sj ∈ Π | ai ∈ Sj}.
The objective of GRAPE is to determine a stable partition
that all the agents agree with. In this paper, we seek for a
Nash stable partition, which is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Nash stable). A partition Π is said to
be Nash stable if, for every agent ai ∈ A, it holds that
(tΠ(i), |SΠ(i)|) i (tj , |Sj ∪ {ai}|), ∀Sj ∈ Π.
In other words, in a Nash stable partition, every agent
prefers its current coalition to joining any of the other coali-
tions. Thus, every agent does not have any conflict within this
partition, and no agent will not unilaterally deviate from its
current decision.
Remark 1 (An advantage of Nash stability: low communica-
tion burden on agents). The rationale behind the use of Nash
stability among various stable solution concepts in hedonic
games [16], [46]–[48] is that it can reduce communication
burden between agents required to reach a social agreement.
In the process of converging to a Nash stable partition, an
agent does not need to get any permission from the other
agents when it is willing to deviate. This property may not
be the case for the other solution concepts. Therefore, each
agent is only required to notify its altered decision without any
negotiation. This fact can reduce inter-agent communication in
the proposed approach.
C. SPAO Preference: Social Inhibition
This section introduces the key condition, called SPAO, that
enables our proposed approach to provide all the desirable
properties described in Section I, and then explains its impli-
cations.
Definition 4 (SPAO). Given an instance (A, T ,P) of GRAPE,
it is said that the preference relation of agent ai with
respect to task tj is SPAO (Single-Peaked-At-One) if it
holds that, for every (tj , p) ∈ X ∗, (tj , p1) i (tj , p2) for any
p1, p2 ∈ {1, ..., na} such that p1 < p2. Besides, we say that
an instance (A, T ,P) of GRAPE is SPAO if the preference
relation of every agent in A with respect to every task in T ∗
is SPAO.
For an example, suppose that Pi is such that
(t1, 1) i (t1, 2) i (t1, 3) i (t2, 1) ∼i (t1, 4) i (t2, 2).
This preference relation indicates that agent ai has (t1, 1) i
(t1, 2) i (t1, 3) i (t1, 4) for task t1, and (t2, 1) i (t2, 2)
for task t2. According to Definition 4, the preference relation
for each of the tasks holds SPAO. For another example, given
that
(t1, 1) i (t1, 2) i (t1, 3) i (t2, 2) ∼i (t1, 4) i (t2, 1),
the preference relation regarding task t1 holds SPAO, whereas
this is not the case for task t2 because of (t2, 2) i (t2, 1).
This paper only considers the case in which every agent
has SPAO preference relations regarding all the given tasks.
Such agents prefer to execute a task with smaller number of
collaborators, namely, they have social inhibition.
Remark 2 (Implications of SPAO). SPAO implies that an
agent’s individual utility should be a monotonically decreasing
function with respect to the size of a coalition. In practice,
SPAO can often emerge. For instance, experimental and simu-
lation results in [49, Figures 3 and 4] show that the total work
capacity resulted from cooperation of multiple robots does not
proportionally increase due to interferences of the robots. In
such a non-superadditive environment [50], assuming that an
agent’s individual work efficiency is considered as its indi-
vidual utility, the individual utility monotonically drops as the
number of collaborators enlarges even though the social utility
is increased. For another example, SPAO also arises when
individual utilities are related with shared-resources. As more
agents use the same resource simultaneously, their individual
productivities become diminished (e.g., traffic affects travel
times [51] [52, Example 3]). As the authors in [50] pointed out,
a non-superadditive case is more realistic than a superadditive
case: agents in a superadditive environment always attempt to
form the grand coalition whereas those in a non-superadditive
case are willing to reduce unnecessary costs. Note that social
utility functions are not restricted so that they can be either
monotonic or non-monotonic.
Remark 3 (Cooperation of selfish agents with different in-
terests). The proposed framework can accommodate selfish
agents who greedily follow their individual preferences as long
as the preferences hold SPAO. This implies that the framework
may be utilized for a combination of swarm systems from
different organisations under the condition that the multiple
systems satisfy SPAO.
5D. Existence of and Convergence to a Nash Stable Partition
Let us prove that if an instance of GRAPE holds SPAO,
there always exists a Nash stable partition and it can be found
within polynomial time.
Definition 5 (Iteration). This paper uses the term iteration
to represent an iterative stage in which an arbitrary agent
compares the set of selectable task-coalition pairs given an
existing partition, and then determines whether or not to join
another coalition including the void task one.
Assumption 5 (Mutual exclusion algorithm). We assume that,
at each iteration, a single agent exclusively makes a decision
and updates the current partition if necessary. This paper refers
to this agent as the deciding agent at the iteration. Based on
the resultant partition, another deciding agent also performs the
same process at the next iteration, and this process continues
until every agent does not deviate from a specific partition,
which is, in fact, a Nash stable partition. To implement this
algorithmic process in practice, the agents need a mutual
exclusion (or called mutex) algorithm to choose the deciding
agent at each iteration. In this section, for simplicity of
description, we assume that all the agents are fully-connected,
by which they somehow select and know the deciding agent.
However, in Section III-E, we will present a distributed mutex
algorithm that enables the proposed approach to be executed
under a strongly-connected communication network even in
an asynchronous manner.
Lemma 1. Given an instance (A, T ,P) of GRAPE that is
SPAO, suppose that a new agent ar /∈ A holding a SPAO pref-
erence relation with regard to every task in T joins (A, T ,P)
in which a Nash stable partition is already established. Then,
the new instance (A˜, T ,P), where A˜ = A ∪ {ar}, also (1)
satisfies SPAO; (2) contains a Nash stable partition; and (3)
the maximum number of iterations required to re-converge to
a Nash stable partition is |A˜|.
Proof. Given a partition Π, for agent ai, the number of
additional co-workers tolerable in its coalition is defined as:
∆Π(i) := min
Sj∈Π\{SΠ(i)}
max
∆∈Z
{
∆ | (tΠ(i), |SΠ(i)|+ ∆) i (tj , |Sj ∪ {ai}|)
}
.
(4)
Due to the SPAO preference relation, this value satisfies the
following characteristics: (a) if Π is Nash stable, for every
agent ai, it holds that ∆Π(i) ≥ 0; (b) if ∆Π(i) < 0, then agent
ai is willing to deviate to another coalition at a next iteration;
and (c) for the agent ai who deviated at the last iteration and
updated the partition as Π′, it holds that ∆Π′(i) ≥ 0.
From Definition 4, it is clear that the new instance (A˜, T ,P)
still holds SPAO. Let Π0 denote a Nash stable partition in the
original instance (A, T ,P). When a new agent ar /∈ A decides
to execute one of the tasks in T and creates a new partition
Π1, it holds that ∆Π1(r) ≥ 0, as shown in (c). If there is
no existing agent aq ∈ A whose ∆Π1(q) < 0, then the new
partition Π1 is Nash stable.
Suppose that there exists at least an agent aq whose
∆Π1(q) < 0. Then, the agent must be one of the existing
members in the coalition that agent ar selected in the last
iteration. As agent aq moves to another coalition and creates
a new partition Π2, the previously-deviated agent ar holds
∆Π2(r) ≥ 1. In other words, an agent who deviates to a
coalition and expels one of the existing agents in that coalition
will not deviate again even if another agent joins the coalition
in a next iteration. This implies that at most |A˜| of iterations
are required to hold ∆Π˜(i) ≥ 0 for every agent ai ∈ A˜, where
the partition Π˜ is Nash stable.
Lemma 1 is essential not only for the existence of and
convergence to a Nash stable partition but also for fast
adaptability to dynamic environments.
Theorem 1 (Existence). If (A, T ,P) is an instance of GRAPE
holding SPAO, then a Nash stable partition always exists.
Proof. This theorem will be proved by induction. Let M(n)
be the following mathematical statement: for |A| = n, if an
instance (A, T ,P) of GRAPE is SPAO, then there exists a
Nash stable partition.
Base case: When n = 1, there is only one agent in an
instance. This agent is allowed to participate in its most
preferred coalition, and the resultant partition is Nash stable.
Therefore, M(1) is true.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that M(k) is true for a
positive integer k such that |A| = k.
Induction step: Suppose that a new agent ai /∈ A whose
preference relation regarding every task in T is SPAO joins
the instance (A, T ,P). This induces a new instance (A˜, T ,P)
where A˜ = A ∪ {ai} and |A˜| = k + 1. From Lemma 1, it is
clear that the new instance also satisfies SPAO and has a
Nash stable partition Π˜. Consequently, M(k + 1) is true. By
mathematical induction, M(n) is true for all positive integers
n ≥ 1.
Theorem 2 (Convergence). If (A, T ,P) is an instance of
GRAPE holding SPAO, then the number of iterations re-
quired to determine a Nash stable partition is at most
|A| · (|A|+ 1)/2.
Proof. Suppose that, given a Nash stable partition in an
instance where there exists only one agent, we add another
arbitrary agent and find a Nash stable partition for this new
instance, and repeat the procedure until all the agents in
A are included. From Lemma 1, if a new agent joins an
instance in which the current partition is Nash stable, then the
maximum number of iterations required to find a new Nash
stable partition is the number of the existing agents plus one.
Therefore, it is trivial that the maximum number of iterations
to find a Nash stable partition of an instance (A, T ,P) is given
as
|A|∑
k=1
k = |A| · (|A|+ 1)/2. (5)
Note that this polynomial-time convergence still holds even
if the agents are initialized to a random partition. Suppose
that we have the following setting: the entire agents A are
firstly not movable from the existing partition, except a set
of free agents A′ ⊆ A; whenever the agents A′ find a
Nash stable partition Π′, one arbitrary agent in ar ∈ A \ A′
additionally becomes liberated and deviates from the current
6coalition SΠ′(r) to another coalition in Π′. In this setting,
from the viewpoint of the agents in A′ \ SΠ′(r), the newly
liberated agent is considered as a new agent as that in Lemma
1. Accordingly, we can still utilize the lemma for the agents
in A′ \ SΠ′(r) ∪ {ar}. The agents also can find a Nash stable
partition if one of them moves to SΠ′(r) during the process,
because, due to ar, it became ∆Π′(i) ≥ 1 for every agent
ai ∈ SΠ′(r) \ {ar}. In a nutshell, the agents A′ ∪ {ar} can
converge to a Nash stable partition within |A′∪{ar}|, which is
equivalent to Lemma 1. Hence, Theorem 1 and this theorem
are also valid for the case when the initial partition of the
agents are randomly given.
E. Decentralized Algorithm
In the previous section, it was assumed that only one agent
is somehow chosen to make a decision at each iteration under
the fully-connected network. On the contrary, in this section,
we propose a decentralized algorithm, as shown in Algorithm
1, in which every agent does decision making based its local
information and affects its neighbors simultaneously under
a strongly-connected network. Despite that, we show that
Theorems 1 and 2 still hold thanks to our proposed distributed
mutex subroutine shown in Algorithm 2. The details of the
decentralized main algorithm are as follows.
Algorithm 1 Decision-making algorithm for each agent ai
// Initialisation
1: satisfied← false; ri ← 0; si ← 0
2: Πi ← {Sφ = A, Sj = φ ∀tj ∈ T }
// Decision-making process begins
3: while true do
// Make a new decision if necessary
4: if satisfied = false then
5: (tj∗, |Sj∗|)← arg max∀Sj∈Πi(tj , |Sj ∪ {ai}|)
6: if (tj∗, |Sj∗|) i (tΠi(i), |SΠi(i)|) then
7: Join Sj∗ and update Πi
8: ri ← ri + 1
9: si ∈ unif[0, 1]
10: end if
11: satisfied = true
12: end if
// Broadcast the local information to neighbor agents
13: Broadcast M i = {ri, si,Πi} and receive Mk from its
neighbors ∀ak ∈ Ni
// Select the valid partition from all the received messages
14: Construct Mircv = {M i,∀Mk}
15: {ri, si,Πi}, satisfied← D-MUTEX(Mircv)
16: end while
Each agent ai has local variables such as Πi, satisfied,
ri, and si (Line 1–2). Here, Πi is the agent’s locally-known
partition; satisfied is a binary variable that indicates whether
or not the agent is satisfied with Πi such that it does not want
to deviate from its current coalition; ri ∈ Z+ is an integer
variable to represent how many times Πi has evolved (i.e.,
the number of iterations happened for updating Πi until that
moment); and si ∈ [0, 1] is a uniform-random variable that
is generated whenever Πi is newly updated (i.e., a random
time stamp). Given Πi, agent ai examines which coalition
is the most preferred among others, assuming that the other
agents remain at the existing coalitions (Line 5). Then, the
agent joins the newly found coalition if it is strongly preferred
than its current coalition. In this case, the agent updates Πi
to reflect its new decision, increases ri, and generates a new
random time stamp si (Line 6–10). In any case, since the agent
ascertained that the currently-selected coalition is the most
preferred, the agent becomes satisfied with Πi (Line 11). Then,
agent ai generates and sends a message M i := {ri, si,Πi} to
its neighbor agents, and vice versa (Line 13).
Since every agent locally updates its locally-known partition
simultaneously, one of the partitions should be regarded as if it
were the partition updated by a deciding agent at the previous
iteration. We refer to this partition as the valid partition at
the iteration. The distributed mutex subroutine in Algorithm
2 enables the agents to recognize the valid partition among
all the locally-known current partitions even under a strongly-
connected network and in asynchronous environments. Before
executing this subroutine, each agent ai collects all the mes-
sages received from its neighbor agents ∀ak ∈ Ni (including
M i) as Mircv = {M i,∀Mk}. Using this message set, the
agent examines whether or not its own partition Πi is valid.
If there exists any other partition Πk such that rk > ri, then
the agent considers Πk more valid than Πi. This also happens
if rk = ri and sk > si, which indicates the case where Πk
and Πi have evolved over the same amount of times, but the
former has a higher time stamp. Since Πk is considered as
more valid, agent ai will need to re-examine if there is a more
preferred coalition given Πk in the next iteration. Thus, the
agent sets satisfied as false (Line 3–10 in Algorithm 2). After
completing this subroutine, depending on satisfied, each agent
proceeds the decision-making process again (i.e., Line 4–12 in
Algorithm 1) and/or just broadcasts the existing locally-known
partition to its neighbor agents (Line 13 in Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 2 Distributed Mutex Subroutine
1: function D-MUTEX(Mircv)
2: satisfied← true
3: for each message Mk ∈Mircv do
4: if (rk > ri) or (rk = ri & sk > si) then
5: ri ← rk
6: si ← sk
7: Πi ← Πk
8: satisfied← false
9: end if
10: end for
11: return {ri, si,Πi}, satisfied
12: end function
In a nutshell, the distributed mutex algorithm makes sure
that there is only one valid partition that dominates (or will
finally dominate depending on the communication network)
any other partitions. In other words, multiple partitions locally
evolve, but one of them only eventually survive as long as
a strongly-connected network is given. From each partition’s
viewpoint, it can be regarded as being evolved by a random
7sequence of the agents under the fully-connected network.
Thus, the partition becomes Nash stable within the polynomial
time as shown in Theorem 2. In an extreme case, we may
encounter multiple Nash stable partitions at the very last.
Nevertheless, thanks to the mutex algorithm, one of them can
be distributedly selected by the agents. All the features imply
that agents using Algorithm 1 can find a Nash stable partition
in a decentralized manner and Theorems 1 and 2 still hold.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Algorithmic Complexity (Scalability)
Firstly, let us discuss about the running time for the pro-
posed framework to find a Nash stable partition. This paper
refers to a unit time required for each agent to proceed the
main loop of Algorithm 1 (Line 4-15) as a time step. De-
pending on the communication network considered, especially
if it is not fully-connected, it may be possible that some of
the given agents have to execute this loop to just propagate
their locally-known partition information without affecting ri
as Line 8. Because this process also spends a unit time step,
we call it as dummy iteration to distinguish from a (normal)
iteration, which increases ri.
Notice that such dummy iterations happen sequentially at
most dG times before a normal iteration occurs, where dG
is the graph diameter of the communication network. Hence,
thanks to Theorem 2, the total required time steps until finding
a Nash stable partition is O(dGn2a). For the fully-connected
network case, it becomes O(n2a) because of dG = 1. Note that
this algorithmic complexity is less than that of the centralized
algorithm, i.e., O(n2a · nt), in [44].
Every agent at each iteration investigates nt + 1 of se-
lectable task-coalition pairs including tφ given a locally-known
valid partition (as shown in Line 5 in Algorithm 1). Therefore,
the computational overhead for an agent is O(nt) per any
iteration. With consideration of the total required time steps,
the running time of the proposed approach for an agent can
be bounded by O(dGntn2a). Note that the running time in
practice can be much less than the bound since Theorem 2 was
conservatively analyzed, as described in the following remark.
Remark 4 (The number of required iterations in practice).
Algorithm 1 allows the entire agents in A to be involved in the
decision-making process, whereas, in the proof for Theorem
2, a new agent can be involved after a Nash stable partition
of existing agents is found. Since agents using Algorithm 1
do not need to find every Nash stable partition for each subset
of the agents, unnecessary iterations can be reduced. Hence,
the number of required iterations in practice may become less
than that shown in Theorem 2, which is also supported by the
experimental results in Section VI-B.
Let us now discuss about the communication overhead for
each agent per iteration. Given a network, agent ai should
communicate with |Ni| of its neighbors, and the size of each
message grows with regard to na. Hence, the communication
overhead of the agent is O(|Ni| · na). It could be quadratic
if |Ni| increases in proportional to na. However, this would
rarely happen in practice due to spatial distribution of agents
and physical limits on communication such as range limitation.
Instead, |Ni| would be most likely saturated in practice.
Remark 5 (Communication overhead vs. Running time). To
reduce the communication overhead, we may impose the
maximum number of transactions per iteration, denoted by nc,
on each agent. Even so, Theorems 1 and 2 are still valid as
long as the union of underlying graphs of the communication
networks over time intervals becomes connected. However,
in return, the number of dummy iterations may increase, so
does the framework’s running time. In an extreme case where
nc = 1 (i.e., unicast mode), dummy iterations may happen in a
row at most na times. Thus, the total required time steps until
finding a Nash stable partition could be O(n3a), whereas the
communication overhead is O(na). In short, the running time
of the framework can be traded off against the communication
overhead for each agent per iteration.
B. Suboptimality
This section investigates the suboptimality lower bound (or
can be called approximation ratio) of the proposed framework
in terms of the global utility, i.e., the objective function in
Equation (1). Given a partition Π, the global utility value can
be equivalently rewritten as
J =
∑
∀ai∈A
ui(tΠ(i), |SΠ(i)|). (6)
Note that we can simply derive {xij} for Equation (1) from
Π for Equation (6), and vice versa. Let JGRAPE and JOPT
represent the global utility of a Nash stable partition obtained
by the proposed framework and the optimal value, respectively.
This paper refers to the fraction of JGRAPE with respect to
JOPT as the suboptimality of GRAPE, denoted by α, i.e.,
α := JGRAPE/JOPT . (7)
The lower bound of the suboptimality can be determined
by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Suboptimality lower bound: general case). Given
a Nash stable partition Π obtained by GRAPE, its suboptimal-
ity in terms of the global utility is lower bounded as follows:
α ≥ JGRAPE/(JGRAPE + λ), (8)
where
λ ≡
∑
∀Sj∈Π
max
ai∈A,p≤|A|
{
p·[ui(tj , p)−ui(tj , |Sj∪{ai}|)]} (9)
Proof. Let Π∗ denote the optimal partition for the objective
function in Equation (6). Given a Nash stable partition Π, from
Definition 3, it holds that, ∀ai ∈ A,
ui(tΠ(i), |SΠ(i)|) ≥ ui(t∗j←i, |Sj ∪ {ai}|), (10)
where t∗j←i indicates task tj ∈ T to which agent ai should
have joined according to the optimal partition Π∗; and Sj ∈ Π
is the coalition for task tj whose participants follow the Nash
stable partition Π.
8The right-hand side of the inequality in Equation (10) can
be rewritten as
ui(t
∗
j←i, |Sj ∪ {ai}|) = ui(t∗j←i, |S∗j |)−{
ui(t
∗
j←i, |S∗j |)− ui(t∗j←i, |Sj ∪ {ai}|)
}
,
(11)
where S∗j ∈ Π∗ is the ideal coalition of task t∗j←i that maxi-
mizes the objective function.
By summing over all the agents, the inequality in Equation
(10) can be said that∑
∀ai∈A
ui(tΠ(i), |SΠ(i)|)
≥
∑
∀ai∈A
ui(t
∗
j←i, |S∗j |)
−
∑
∀ai∈A
{ui(t∗j←i, |S∗j |)− ui(t∗j←i, |Sj ∪ {ai}|)}.
(12)
The left-hand side of the inequality in Equation (12) represents
the objective function value of the Nash stable partition Π,
i.e., JGRAPE , and the first term of the right-hand side is the
optimal value, i.e., JOPT . The second term in the right-hand
side can be interpreted as the summation of the utility lost
of each agent caused by the belated decision to its optimal
task, provided that the other agents still follow the Nash stable
partition.
The upper bound of the second term is given by
nt∑
j=1
|S∗j | · max
ai∈S∗j
{ui(t∗j←i, |S∗j |)−ui(t∗j←i, |Sj ∪{ai}|)}. (13)
This is at most ∑
∀Sj∈Π
max
ai∈A,p≤|A|
Lij [p] ≡ λ, (14)
where Lij [p] = p · (ui(tj , p)− ui(tj , |Sj ∪ {ai}|)).
Hence, the inequality in Eqn (12) can be rewritten as
JGRAPE ≥ JOPT − λ.
Dividing both sides by JGRAPE and rearranging them yield
the suboptimality lower bound of the Nash stable partition, as
given by Equation (8).
Although Theorem 3 does not provide a fixed-value lower
bound, it can be determined as long as a Nash stable partition
and agents’ individual utility functions are given. Nevertheless,
as a special case, if the social utility for any coalition is
non-decreasing (or monotonically increasing) in terms of the
number of co-working agents, then we can obtain a fixed-value
lower bound for the suboptimality of a Nash stable partition.
Theorem 4 (Suboptimality lower bound: a special case).
Given an instance (A, T ,P) of GRAPE, if (i) the social utility
for any coalition is non-decreasing with regard to the number
of participants, i.e., for any Sj ⊆ A and al ∈ A\Sj , it holds
that ∑
∀ai∈Sj
ui(tj , |Sj |) ≤
∑
∀ai∈Sj∪{al}
ui(tj , |Sj ∪ {al}|),
and (ii) all the individual utilities can derive SPAO preference
relations, then a Nash stable partition Π obtained by GRAPE
provides at least 50% of suboptimality in terms of the global
utility.
Proof. Firstly, we introduce some definitions and notations
that facilitate to describe this proof. Given a partition Π of
an instance (A, T ,P), the global utility is denoted by
V (Π) :=
∑
∀ai∈A
ui(tΠ(i), |SΠ(i)|). (15)
We use operator ⊕ as follows. Given any two partitions
ΠA = {SA0 , ..., SAnt} and ΠB = {SB0 , ..., SBnt},
ΠA ⊕ΠB := {SA0 ∪ SB0 , SA1 ∪ SB1 , ..., SAnt ∪ SBnt}.
Since ∪ntj=0SAj = ∪ntj=0SBj = A, there may exist the
same agent ai even in two different coalitions in ΠA ⊕
ΠB . For instance, suppose that ΠA = {{a1}, {a2}, {a3}}
and ΠB = {∅, {a1, a3}, {a2}}. Then, ΠA ⊕ ΠB =
{{a1}, {a1, a2, a3}, {a2, a3}}. We regard such an agent as two
different agents in ΠA ⊕ΠB . Accordingly, the operation may
increase the number of total agents in the resultant partition.
Using the definitions described above, condition (i) implies
that
V (ΠA) ≤ V (ΠA ⊕ΠB). (16)
From now on, we will show that 12V (Π
∗) ≤ V (Πˆ),
where Π∗ = {S∗0 , S∗1 , ..., S∗nt} is an optimal partition and
Πˆ = {Sˆ0, Sˆ1, ..., Sˆnt} is a Nash stable partition. By doing so,
this theorem can be proved. From the definition in Equation
(15), it can be said that
V (Πˆ⊕Π∗) =
∑
∀ai∈A
ui(tΠˆ(i), |SˆΠˆ(i) ∪ S∗Πˆ(i)|)
+
∑
∀ai∈A−
ui(tΠ∗(i), |SˆΠ∗(i) ∪ S∗Π∗(i)|),
(17)
where A− is the set of agents whose decisions follow not
the Nash stable partition Πˆ but only the optimal partition Π∗.
Due to condition (ii), the first term of the right-hand side in
Equation (17) is no more than∑
∀ai∈A
ui(tΠˆ(i), |SˆΠˆ(i)|) ≡ V (Πˆ). (18)
Likewise, the second term is also at most∑
∀ai∈A−
ui(tΠ∗(i), |SˆΠ∗(i) ∪ {ai}|). (19)
By the definition of Nash stability (i.e., for every agent ai ∈ A,
ui(tΠˆ(i), |SˆΠˆ(i)|) ≥ ui(tj , |Sˆj ∪ {ai}|), ∀Sˆj ∈ Πˆ), the above
equation is at most ∑
∀ai∈A−
ui(tΠˆ(i), |SˆΠˆ(i)|), (20)
which is also no more than, because of A− ⊆ A,∑
∀ai∈A
ui(tΠˆ(i), |SˆΠˆ(i)|) ≡ V (Πˆ). (21)
9Accordingly, the left-hand side of Equation (17) holds the
following inequality:
V (Πˆ⊕Π∗) ≤ 2V (Πˆ). (22)
Thanks to Equation (16), it follows that
V (Π∗) ≤ V (Πˆ⊕Π∗).
Therefore, V (Π∗) ≤ 2V (Πˆ), which completes this proof.
C. Adaptability
Our proposed framework is also adaptable to dynamic
environments such as unexpected addition or loss of agents
or tasks, owing to its fast convergence to a Nash stable
partition. Thanks to Lemma 1, if a new agent additionally
joins an ongoing mission in which an assignment was already
determined, the number of iterations required for converging
to a new Nash stable partition is at most the number of the
total agents. Responding to any environmental change, the
framework is able to establish a new agreed task assignment
within polynomial time.
D. Robustness in Asynchronous Environments
In the proposed framework, for every iteration, each agent
does not need to wait until nor ensure that its locally-known
information has been propagated to a certain neighbor group.
Instead, as described in Remark 5, it is enough for the
agent to receive the local information from one of its neigh-
bors, to make a decision, and to send the updated partition
back to some of its neighbors. Temporary disconnection or
non-operation of some agents may cause dummy iterations
additionally. However, it does not affect the existence of,
the convergence toward, and the suboptimality of a Nash
stable partition under the proposed framework, which is also
supported by Section VI-E.
V. GRAPE WITH MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
This section addresses another task allocation problem
where each task may require at least a certain number of agents
for its completion. This problem can be defined as follows.
Problem 2. Given a set of agents A and a set of tasks T , the
objective is to find an assignment such that
max
{xij}
∑
∀ai∈A
∑
∀tj∈T
ui(tj , p)xij , (23)
subject to ∑
∀ai∈A
xij ≥ Rj , ∀tj ∈ T , (24)
∑
∀tj∈T
xij ≤ 1, ∀ai ∈ A, (25)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(ai, tj) ∈ A× T , (26)
where Rj ∈ N ∪ {0} is the number of minimum required
agents for task tj , and all the other variables are identically
defined as those in Problem 1. Here, it is considered that, for
∀ai ∈ A and ∀tj ∈ T ,
ui(tj , p) = 0 if p < Rj (27)
because task tj cannot be completed in this case. Note that
any task tj without such a requirement is regarded to have
Rj = 0.
For each task tj having Rj > 0, even if ui(tj , p) is
monotonically decreasing at p ≥ Rj , the individual utility can
not be simply transformed to a preference relation holding
SPAO because of Equation (27). Thus, we need to modify the
utility function to yield alternative values for the case when
p < Rj . We refer to the modified utility as auxiliary individual
utility u˜i, which is defined as
u˜i(tj , p) =
{
u0i (tj , p) if p ≤ Rj
ui(tj , p) otherwise,
(28)
where u0i (tj , p) is the dummy utility of agent ai with regard
to task tj when p ≤ Rj .
The dummy utility is intentionally used also for the case
when p = Rj in order to find an assignment that holds
Equation (24). For this, the auxiliary individual utility should
satisfy the following condition.
Condition 1. For every agent ai ∈ A, its preference relation
Pi holds that, for any two tasks tj , tk ∈ T ,
(tj , Rj) i (tk, Rk + 1).
This condition enables every agent to prefer a task for which
the number of co-working agents is less than its minimum
requirement, over any other tasks whose requirements are
already fulfilled. Under this condition, as long as the agent set
A is such that |A| ≥∑∀tj∈T Rj and a Nash stable partition
is found, the resultant assignment satisfies Equation (24).
Proposition 1. Given an instance of Problem 2 where ui(tj , p)
∀i ∀j is a monotonically decreasing function with regard to
∀p ≥ Rj , if the dummy utilities u0i (tj , p) ∀i ∀j in (28) are
set to satisfy Condition 1 and SPAO for ∀p ≤ Rj , then all
the resultant auxiliary individual utilities u˜i(tj , p) ∀i ∀j ∀p
can be transformed to a na-tuple of preference relations P
that hold Condition 1 as well as SPAO for ∀p ∈ {1, ..., na}.
In the corresponding instance of GRAPE (A, T ,P), a Nash
stable partition can be determined within polynomial times as
shown in Theorems 1 and 2 because of SPAO, and the resultant
partition can satisfy Equation (24) due to Condition 1.
Let us give an example. Suppose that there exist 100 agents
A, and 3 tasks T = {t1, t2, t3} where only t3 has its minimum
requirement R3 = 5; for every agent ai ∈ A, individual utili-
ties for t1 and t2, i.e., ui(t1, p) and ui(t2, p), are much higher
than that for t3 in ∀p ∈ {1, ..., 100}. We can find a Nash stable
partition for this example, as described in Proposition 1, by
setting u0i (tj , p)= max∀tj{ui(tj , Rj + 1)}+ β for ∀p ≤ Rj ,
∀ai ∈ A, where β > 0 is an arbitrary positive constant.
After a Nash stable partition is found, in order to compute
the objective function value in (23), the original individual
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utility function ui should be used instead of the auxiliary one
u˜i.
Proposition 2. Given a Nash stable partition Π obtained by
implementing Proposition 1, its suboptimality bound α is such
that
α ≥ JGRAPE
JGRAPE + λ˜
· JGRAPE
JGRAPE + δ
. (29)
Here, δ ≡ J˜GRAPE−JGRAPE , where J˜GRAPE (or JGRAPE)
is the objective function value in (23) using u˜i (or using ui)
given the Nash stable partition. Likewise, λ˜ is the value in (9)
using u˜i. In addition to this, if every u˜i satisfies the conditions
for Theorem 4, then
α ≥ 1
2
· JGRAPE
JGRAPE + δ
. (30)
Proof. Since the Nash stable partition Π is obtained by using
u˜i, it can be said from Equations (7) and (8) that
J˜GRAPE
J˜OPT
≥ J˜GRAPE
J˜GRAPE + λ˜
. (31)
Due to the fact that u˜i(tj , p) ≥ ui(tj , p) for ∀i, j, p, it is clear
that J˜GRAPE ≥ JGRAPE and J˜OPT ≥ JOPT . By letting
that δ := J˜GRAPE − JGRAPE , the left term in (31) is at
most (JGRAPE + δ)/JOPT . Besides, the right term in (31) is
a monotonically-increasing function with regard to J˜GRAPE ,
and thus, it is lower bounded by JGRAPE/(JGRAPE + λ˜).
From this, Equation (31) can be rewritten as Equation (29) by
multiplying JGRAPE/(JGRAPE + δ).
Likewise, for the case when every u˜i satisfies the conditions
for Theorem 4, it can be said that J˜GRAPE ≥ 1/2 · J˜OPT ,
which can be transformed into Equation (30) as shown above.
Notice that if δ = 0 for the Nash stable partition in Propo-
sition 2, then the suboptimality bounds become equivalent to
those in Theorems 3 and 4.
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
This section validates the performances of the proposed
framework with respect to its scalability, suboptimality, adapt-
ability against dynamic environments, and robustness in asyn-
chronous environments.
A. Mission Scenario and Settings
1) Utility functions: Firstly, we introduce the social and
individual utilities used in this numerical experiment. We
consider that if multiple robots execute a task together as a
coalition, then they are given a certain level of reward for
the task. The amount of the reward varies depending on the
number of the co-working agents. The reward is shared with
the agents, and each agent’s individual utility is considered
as the shared reward minus the cost required to personally
spend on the task (e.g., fuel consumption for movement). In
this experiment, the equal fair allocation rule [53], [54] is
adopted. Under the rule, a task’s reward is equally shared
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Fig. 1. Examples of utility functions used in the numerical experiment
are shown, depending on the two different task types (i.e., peaked-reward
and submodular-reward): (a) the social utility of a coalition; (b) an agent’s
individual utility.
among the members. Therefore, the individual utility of agent
ai executing task tj with coalition Sj is defined as
ui(tj , |Sj |) = r(tj , |Sj |)/|Sj | − ci(tj), (32)
where r(tj , |Sj |) is the reward from task tj when it is executed
by Sj together, and ci(tj) is the cost that agent ai needs to
pay for the task. Here, we simply set the cost as a function of
the distance from agent ai to task tj . We set that if ui(tj , |Sj |)
is not positive, agent ai prefers to join Sφ over Sj .
This experiment considers two types of tasks. For the
first type, a task’s reward becomes higher as the number of
participants gets close to a specific desired number. We refer
to such a task as a peaked-reward task, and its reward can be
defined as
r(tj , |Sj |) =
rmaxj · |Sj |
ndj
· e−|Sj |/ndj+1, (33)
where ndj represents the desired number, and r
max
j is the
peaked reward in case that ndj of agents are involved in.
Consequently, the individual utility of agent ai with regard
to task tj becomes the following equation:
ui(tj , |Sj |) =
rmaxj
ndj
· e−|Sj |/ndj+1 − ci(tj). (34)
For the second type, a task’s reward becomes higher as
more agents are involved, but the corresponding marginal gain
decreases. This type of tasks is said to be submodular-reward,
and the reward can be defined as
r(tj , |Sj |) = rminj · logj (|Sj |+ j − 1), (35)
where rminj indicates the reward obtained if there is only one
agent is involved, and j > 1 is the design parameter regarding
the diminishing marginal gain. The resultant individual utility
becomes as follows:
ui(tj , |Sj |) = rminj · logj (|Sj |+ j − 1)/|Sj | − ci(tj). (36)
Figure 1 illustrates examples of the social utilities and
individual utilities for the task types introduced above. For
simplification, agents’ costs are ignored in the figure. We set
rmaxj , n
d
j , r
min
j and j to be 60, 15, 10, and 2, respectively.
Notice that the individual utilities are monotonically decreas-
ing in both cases, as depicted in Figure 1(b). Therefore, given
11
a mission that entails these task types, we can generate an
instance (A, T ,P) of GRAPE that holds SPAO.
2) Parameters generation: In the following sections, we
will mainly utilize Monte Carlo simulations. At each run,
nt tasks and na agents are uniform-randomly located in a
1000 m× 1000 m arena and a 250 m× 250 m arena within
there, respectively. For a scenario including peaked-reward
tasks, rmaxj is randomly generated from a uniform distribution
over [1000, 2000] × na/nt, and ndj is set to be the rounded
value of (rmaxj /
∑
∀tk∈T ∗ r
max
k )×na. For a scenario including
submodular-reward tasks, j is set as 2, and rminj is uniform-
randomly generated over [1000, 2000]× 1/ logj (na/nt + 1).
3) Communication network: Given a set of agents, their
communication network is strongly-connected in a way that
only contains a bidirectional minimum spanning tree with
consideration of the agents’ positions. Furthermore, we also
consider the fully-connected network in some experiments in
order to examine the influence of the network. The communi-
cation network is randomly generated at each instance, and is
assumed to be sustained during a mission except the robustness
test simulations in Section VI-E.
B. Scalability
To investigate the effectiveness of nt and na upon the
scalability of the proposed approach, we conduct Monte Carlo
simulations with 100 runs for the scenarios introduced in
Section VI-A with a fixed nt = 20 and various na ∈
{80, 160, 240, 320} and for those with na = 160 and nt ∈
{5, 10, 15, 20}. Figure 2 shows the statistical results using box-
and-whisker plots, where the green boxes indicate the results
from the scenarios with the peaked-reward tasks and the ma-
genta boxes are those with the submodular-reward tasks. The
blue and red lines connecting the boxes represent the average
value for each test case (na, nt) under a strongly-connected
network and the fully-connected network, respectively.
The left subfigure in Figure 2(a) shows that the ratio of
the number of required (normal) iterations to that of agents
linearly increases as more agents are involved. This implies
that the proposed framework has quadratic complexity with
regard to the number of agents (i.e., C1n2a), as stated in
Theorem 2, but with C1 being much less than 12 , which is
the value from the theorem. C1 can become even lower (e.g.,
C1 = 5× 10−4 in the experiments) under the fully-connected
network. Such C1 being smaller than 12 may be explained
by Remark 4: the algorithmic efficiency of Algorithm 1 can
reduce unnecessary iterations that may be induced in the
procedure of the proof for Theorem 2.
On the other hand, the left subfigure in Figure 2(b) shows
that the number of required iterations decreases with regard
to the number of tasks. This trend may be caused by the fact
that more selectable options provided to the fixed number of
agents can reduce possible conflicts between the agents.
Furthermore, in the two results, the trends regarding either
na or nt have higher slopes under a strongly-connected
network than those under the fully-connected network. This
is because the former condition is more sensitive to conflicts
between agents, and thus causes additional iterations. For
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Fig. 2. Convergence performance of the proposed framework is shown,
depending on communication networks (i.e., Strongly-connected vs. Fully-
connected) and utility function types (i.e., Peaked-reward vs. Submodular-
reward) with different number of agents and tasks: (Left) the number of
(normal) iterations happened relative to that of agents; (Right) the number
of time steps happened (i.e., normal and dummy iterations) relative to that of
iterations.
example, agents at the middle nodes of the network may
change their decisions (and thus increase the number of
iterations) while the local partition information of the agent at
one end node is being propagated to the other end nodes. Such
unnecessary iterations in the middle might not have occurred
if the agents at all the end nodes were directly connected to
each other.
The right subfigures in Figure 2(a) and (b) indicate that
approximately 3–4 times of dummy iterations, compared with
the required number of normal iterations, are additionally
needed under a strongly-connected network. Noting that the
mean values of the graph diameter dG for the instances with
na ∈ {80, 160, 240, 320} are 36, 58, 75 and 92, respectively,
the results show that the amount of dummy iterations happened
is much less than the bound value, which is dG as pointed out
in Section IV-A. On the contrary, under the fully-connected
network, there is no need of such a dummy iteration, and thus
the required number of iterations and that of time steps are
the same.
C. Suboptimality
This section examines the suboptimality of the proposed
framework by using Monte Carlo simulations with 100 in-
stances. In each instance, there are nt = 3 of tasks and
na = 12 of agents who are strongly-connected. Figure 3
presents the true suboptimality of each instance, which is the
ratio of the global utility obtained by the proposed framework
to that by a brute-force search, i.e., JGRAPE/JOPT , and the
lower bound given by Theorem 3. A blue circle and a red
cross in the figure indicate the true suboptimality and the
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Fig. 3. True suboptimality of a Nash stable partition obtained by GRAPE
for each run of the Monte Carlo simulation (denoted by a blue circle) and
its lower bound provided by Theorem 3 (denoted by a red cross) under a
strongly-connected communication network: (a) the scenarios with peaked-
reward tasks; (b) the scenarios with submodular-reward tasks
lower bound, respectively. The results show that the framework
provides near-optimal solutions in almost all cases and the
suboptimality of each Nash stable partition is enclosed by the
corresponding lower bound.
The suboptimality may be improved if the agents are
allowed to investigate a larger search space, for example,
possible coalitions caused by co-deviation of multiple agents.
However, this strategy in return may increase communication
transactions between the agents because they have to notice
each other’s willingness unless their individual utility func-
tions are known to each other, which is in contradiction to
Assumption 4. Besides, the computational overhead for each
agent per iteration also becomes more expensive than O(nt),
which is the complexity for unilateral searching, as shown in
Section IV-A. Hence, the resultant algorithm’s complexity may
hinder its practical applicability to a large-scale multiple agent
system.
Figure 4 depicts the suboptimality lower bounds for the
large-size problems that were previously addressed in Sec-
tion VI-B. It is clearly shown that the agent communication
network does not make any effect on the suboptimality lower
bound of a Nash stable partition. Although there is no universal
trend of the suboptimality with regard to na and nt in both
utility types, it is suggested that the features of the lower
bound given by Theorem 3 can be influenced by the utility
functions considered. In the experiments, the suboptimality
bound averagely remain above than 60–70 %.
D. Adaptability
This section discusses the adaptability of our proposed
framework in response to dynamic environments such as
unexpected inclusion or loss of agents or tasks. Suppose that
there are 10 tasks and 160 agents in a mission, and a Nash
stable partition was already found as a baseline. During the
mission, the number of agents (or tasks) changes; the range of
the change is from losing 50% of the existing agents (or tasks)
to additionally including new ones as much as 50% of them.
For each dynamical environment, a Monte Carlo simulation
with 100 instances is performed by randomly including or
excluding a subset of the corresponding number of agents or
tasks. Here, we consider a strongly-connected communication
network.
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Fig. 4. The suboptimality lower bound, given by Theorem 3, of a Nash
stable partition obtained by GRAPE, depending on communication networks
(i.e., Strongly-connected vs. Fully-connected) and utility function types (i.e.,
Peaked-reward vs. Submodular-reward): (a) fixed nt = 20 with varying na ∈
{80, 160, 240, 320}; (b) fixed na = 160 with varying nt ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}
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Fig. 5. The plot shows the number of additional iterations required for re-
converging toward a Nash stable partition relative to the number of agents
in the case when some agents or tasks are partially lost or newly involved
(Baseline: nt = 10, na = 160, and a Nash stable partition was already
found). Negative values in the x-axis indicate that the corresponding number of
existing agents or tasks are lost. Positive values indicate that the corresponding
number of new agents or tasks are included in an ongoing mission. A strongly-
connected communication network is used.
Figure 5(a) illustrates that the more agents are involved
additionally, the more iterations are required for re-converging
to a new Nash stable partition. This is because the inclusion
of a new agent may lead to additional iterations at most as
much as the number of the total agents including the new
agent (as shown in Lemma 1). On the contrary, the loss of
existing agents does not seem to have any apparent relation
with the number of iterations. A possible explanation is that
the exclusion of an existing agent is favorable to the other
agents due to SPAO preferences. This stimulates only a limited
number of agents who are preferred to move to the coalition
where the excluded agent was. This feature induces fewer
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additional iterations to reach a new Nash stable partition,
compared with the case of adding a new agent.
Figure 5(b) shows that eliminating existing tasks causes
more iterations than including new tasks. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that removing any task releases the agents
performing the task free and it results in extra iterations as
much as the number of the freed agents. On the other hand,
adding new tasks induces relatively fewer additional iterations
because only some of the existing agents are attracted to these
tasks.
In summary, as the ratio of the number of agents to that
of tasks increases, the number of additional iterations for
convergence to a new Nash stable partition also increases. This
result corresponds to the trend described in Section VI-B, i.e.,
the left subfigures in Figure 2(a) and (b). In all the cases of
this experiment, the number of additionally induced iterations
still remains at the same order of the number of the given
agents, which implies that the proposed framework provides
excellent adaptability.
E. Robustness in Asynchronous Environments
This section investigates the robustness of the proposed
framework in asynchronous environments. This scenario as-
sumes that a certain fraction of the given agents, which
are randomly chosen at each time step, somehow can not
execute Algorithm 1 and even can not communicate with
other normally-working neighbor agents. We refer to such
agents as non-operating agents. Given that nt = 5 and
na = 40, the fractions of the non-operating agents are set as
{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. In each case, we conduct 100 instances
of Monte Carlo experiments for which the submodular-reward
tasks are used.
Figure 6(a) presents that the number of (normal) iterations
required for converging to a Nash stable partition remains
at the same level regardless of the fraction of the non-
operating agents. Despite that, the required time steps increase
as more agents become non-operating, as shown in Figure
6(b). Note that time steps growth rate means the ratio of the
total required time steps to those for the case when all the
agents operate normally. These findings indicate that, due to
communicational discontinuity caused by the non-operating
agents, the framework may take more time to wait for these
agents to operate again and then to disseminate locally-known
partition information over the entire agents. As such, dummy
iterations may increase in asynchronous environments, though
the proposed framework is still able to find a Nash stable
partition. Furthermore, the resultant Nash stable partition’s
suboptimality lower bound obtained by Theorem 3 is not
affected, as presented in Figure 6(c).
F. Visualization
We have na = 320 agents and nt = 5 tasks. The initial
locations of the given agents are randomly generated, and the
overall formation shape is different in each test scenario such
as being circle, skewed circle, and square (denoted by Scenario
#1, #2, and #3, respectively). The tasks are also randomly
located away from the agents. In this simulation, each agent
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Fig. 6. Robustness test in asynchronous environments at scenarios with
nt = 10, na = 160, and the submodular-reward tasks: the plot shows the
effectiveness of the fraction of non-operating agents with regard to: (a) the
number of iterations happened until convergence relative to that of agents;
(b) the ratio of the time steps happened to those for the normal case; (c) the
suboptimality lower bound by Theorem 3.
is able to communicate with its nearby agents within a radius
of 50 m. Here, the submodular-reward tasks are used.
Figure 7 shows the visualized task allocation results, where
the circles and the squares indicate the positions of the agents
and the tasks, respectively. The lines between the circles
represent the communication networks of the agents. The
colored agents are assigned to the same colored task, for
example, yellow agents belong to the team for executing the
yellow task. The size of a square indicates the reward of the
corresponding task. The cost for an agent with regard to a
task is considered as a function of the distance from the agent
to the task. The allocation results seem to be reasonable with
consideration of the task rewards and the costs.
The number of iterations required to find a Nash stable
partition is 1355, 1380, and 1295 for Scenario #1, #2, and
#3, respectively. The number of dummy iterations happened is
just 20–30% of that of the iterations. This value is much fewer
than the results in Figure 2 because the networks considered
here are more connected than those in Section VI-B.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a novel game-theoretical framework
that addresses a task allocation problem for a robotic swarm
consisting of self-interested agents. We showed that selfish
agents whose individual interests are transformable to SPAO
preferences can converge to a Nash stable partition by us-
ing the proposed simple decentralized algorithm, which is
executable even in asynchronous environments and under a
strongly-connected communication network. We analytically
and experimentally presented that the proposed framework
provides scalability, a certain level of guaranteed suboptimal-
ity, adaptability, robustness, and a potential to accommodate
different interests of agents.
As this framework can be considered as a new sub-branch
of self-organized approaches, one of our ongoing works is to
compare it with one of the existing methods. Defining a fair
scenario for both methods is non-trivial and requires careful
consideration; otherwise, a resultant unsuitable scenario may
provide biased results. Secondly, another natural progression
of this study is to relax anonymity of agents and thus to con-
sider a combination of the agents’ identities. Experimentally,
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(a) Scenario #1
(b) Scenario #2
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Fig. 7. Visualized task allocation results are shown with different geographic
scenarios (nt = 5, na = 320). Each square and its size represent each
task’s position and its reward (or demand), respectively. The circles and the
lines between them indicate the positions of agents and their communication
network, respectively. The color of each circle implies that the corresponding
agent is assigned to the same colored task.
we have often observed that heterogeneous agents with social
inhibition also can converge to a Nash stable partition. More
research would be needed to analyze the quality of a Nash
stable partition obtained by the proposed framework in terms
of min max because our various experiments showed that the
outcome provides individual utilities to agents in a balanced
manner.
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